Realism About Remedies and the Need for a CDA Takedown: A Comparative Analysis of § 230 of the CDA and the U.K. Defamation Act 2013 by Bennis, Amanda
Florida Journal of International Law 
Volume 27 Issue 2 Article 4 
January 2015 
Realism About Remedies and the Need for a CDA Takedown: A 
Comparative Analysis of § 230 of the CDA and the U.K. 
Defamation Act 2013 
Amanda Bennis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bennis, Amanda (2015) "Realism About Remedies and the Need for a CDA Takedown: A Comparative 
Analysis of § 230 of the CDA and the U.K. Defamation Act 2013," Florida Journal of International Law: Vol. 
27 : Iss. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol27/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For 
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu. 
NOTE
REALISM ABOUT REMEDIES AND THE NEED FOR A CDA
TAKEDOWN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF § 230 OF THE
CDA AND THE U.K. DEFAMATION ACT 2013
Amanda Bennis*
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 298
II. SECTION 230 OF THE CDA NEEDS TO BE AMENDED TO
ADDRESS THE INTERNET'S IMPACT ON U.S.
D EFAM ATION LAW ...................................................................... 301
A. Unique Aspects of the Internet ............................................. 301
B. Defamation and the Internet ................................................ 303
1. Traditional Elements of Defamation ................................ 303
2. Obstacles to Recovery in Internet Defamation Cases ...... 304
III. T H E C D A .................................................................................... 3 06
A. Intent Behind the Creation of the CDA ................................ 306
B. The Ambiguity Created by § 230 .......................................... 307
C. Judicial Interpretation of§ 230(c)-A Divergence from
Congress's Underlying Objective and the Creation of
Immunity for Both Publishers and Distributors ................... 309
1. Zeran v. America Online, Inc ........................................... 309
2. Post-Zeran and § 230 Immunity ................................. 311
D. Growing Dissatisfaction with the Broad
Interpretation of§ 230 .................................................... 312
IV. THE INTERNET, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND
D EFAMATION LAW ..................................................................... 314
A. The 1996 UK. Defamation Act and the European
Union Electronic Commerce Directive ........................... 314
B. The "New" U.K. Defamation Act of2013 ........................... 315
C. Potential Areas of Concern for the United States ............ 317
* Amanda Bennis is an Associate in the Corporate and Securities Department at Stearns
Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A. She graduated in 2015 with her J.D. from the
University of Florida Levin College of Law. The author would like to thank Professors Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky and Elizabeth Lear at the University of Florida Levin College of Law for their
assistance, comments, guidance, and encouragement hroughout the Note writing process. The
author would also like to thank her family for their love and support.
1
Bennis: Realism About Remedies and the Need for a CDA Takedown: A Compara
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: AMEND § 230 TO INCLUDE A
FEDERAL TAKEDOWN REMEDY .................................................. 319
A . Jurisdictional Concerns ....................................................... 319
B. The Interplay Between the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Statute ...................... 321
C. Amend § 230 to Include a Federal Takedown
Rem edy P rovision ................................................................ 322
D. Potential Concerns with and Objections to Proposed
Federal Takedown Remedy .................................................. 326
V I. C ONCLUSION ............................................................................... 328
I. INTRODUCTION
Jane Doe logs onto ProfessionalNetworking.com, a website forum
where professionals can network with other professionals around the
world. She discovers a defamatory post saying, "Jane Doe is a cheating
slut who cannot be trusted." Jane wants the defamatory statement aken
down from the website. In the United States, Jane cannot get the
statement taken down, yet had Jane lived in the United Kingdom, she
would be able to get the statement aken down.
The problem encountered by the above victim of cyber defamation is
the limited avenues for relief in the United States, specifically the lack of
a takedown remedy. Cyber misconduct victims sometimes have the
ability to pursue a civil remedy against the author of a defamatory
statement provided the author's identity is ascertainable.1 However, the
Internet has presented a unique problem in that cyber victims face
difficult statutory, judicial, and technological obstacles in seeking the
takedown of the defamatory statement from the Internet. Notably, victims
of cyber misconduct are generally precluded from bringing suit against
the interactive computer service provider (ISP)2 to seek the removal of
1. See Tara E. Lynch, Good Samaritan or Defamation Defender? Amending the
Communications Decency Act to Correct the Misnomer of § 230... Without Expanding ISP
Liability, 19 SYRACUSE SCL & TECH. L. REP. 1, 17 (2008) ("For plaintiffs who could identify their
online defamer, the loss was simply monetary.").
2. 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(2) ("The term 'interactive computer service' means any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.").
The courts have interpreted ISP "to include all intermediaries," especially website operators.
Nancy S. Kim, Website Design and Liability, 52 JuRIMETRICs J. 383, 393 (2012) (citing Fair Hous.
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1161-63 (9th Cir.
2008) & Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).
[Vol. 27
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the defamatory statement.3 As the number of Internet users steadily
increases,4 there has been a corresponding increase in the amount of
online defamation.
5
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which
regulates the Internet and ISP liability, serves as a statutory obstacle to
the ultimate goal of a victim of cyber defamation of restoring his or her
reputation.6 Specifically, § 230 precludes cyber defamation victims, as
well as all plaintiffs from bringing suit against the ISP, for either civil or
equitable relief, as the publisher or distributor of the defamatory content.7
Section 230 has enabled the Internet to become a forum where people,
behind the safety of their computer screens or smart phones, have the
ability to post defamatory content without any regard for the
consequences of their conduct or the subsequent harm to the victim's
reputation.8 In fact, the "judiciary's inflated interpretation of § 230 has
created a legal environment that is ideal for injury and difficult for
redress."9 Although there is general agreement among legal scholars that
§ 230 should be updated to address the unique aspects of the Internet and
include a takedown remedy for cyber misconduct,'° currently, no U.S.
3. See 47 U.S.C. § 230; David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Infunctions,
55 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 16 (2013) ("§ 230 ... grants ... [ISPs] broad protection from
defamation claims based on the speech of third parties, including protection from injunctive
relief.").
4. A recent statistic has shown that global Internet use has increased 566.4% from 2000
to 2012. Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics, Internet Usage Statistics: The
Internet Big Picture, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).
5. See Ardia, supra note 3, at I 1 ("Today, bloggers, users of social media, and 'citizen
journalists' are more often the targets of defamation claims.").
6. See id. at 15-16 ("A study conducted in the 1980s... found that only 20 percent of
plaintiffs sued to obtain money as compensation for their reputational harms. Instead,... what
libel plaintiffs desire most is a correction or retraction.").
7. See 47 U.S.C. § 230; David E. Hallett, How to Destroy a Reputation and Get Away
with it, the Communication Decency Act Examined: Do the Policies and Standards Set Out in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act Provide a Solution for a Person Defamed Online, 41 IDEA
259, 274 (2001) ("The CDA statutorily limits ISP liability by making it impossible to find an
essential element of the claim, publication.").
8. "The CDA does not adequately protect society from would be online defamers."
Hallett, supra note 7, at 277. Sarah H. Ludington, Aiming at the Wrong Target: The "Audience
Targeting" Test for Personal Jurisdiction in Internet Defamation Cases, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 541,
542 (2012) ("With a few keystrokes, I can publish an injurious falsehood accessible to anyone in
the world with an Internet connection and the desire to read it.").
9. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. Rnv.
335, 341 (2005). "ISPs have no obligation to remove tortious materials, to prevent the reposting
of objectionable materials, or to help victims track down the primary wrongdoers." Id.
10. See Allison E. Horton, Beyond Control?: The Rise and Fall of Defamation Regulation
on the Internet, 43 VAL. U. L. REv. 1265, 1314 (2009) (discussing how the Internet's development
3
Bennis: Realism About Remedies and the Need for a CDA Takedown: A Compara
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
scholar fully analyzes the practical aspects of implementing and
enforcing a takedown decree for post-publication defamatory speech.'1
Conversely, other countries12 have enacted takedown provisions to
provide remedies for cyber defamation. Notably, the United Kingdom
recently passed the U.K. Defamation Act 201313 which reformed U.K.
defamation law to account for the uniqueness of the Internet and its
pervasive use throughout society. The U.K. Defamation Act 2013
provides website operators a defense from liability 14 while also providing
U.K. courts with the power to require a website operator to take down
defamatory content. 
15
This Article provides a proposed method for instituting a federal
takedown remedy for a state tort without subjecting ISPs to liability. This
proposed solution effectively balances a successful mechanism for
remedying harm caused by cyber misconduct with allowing free speech
and the continuing growth of the Internet as a popular medium for
communication.
Part II examines the unique aspects of the Internet, provides a brief
background of traditional defamation law, and discusses the current
obstacles to recovery victims of cyber defamation encounter under § 230.
Part III reviews the background of the CDA, judicial interpretation of
§ 230, and the growing dissatisfaction with the broad interpretation of
§ 230. Part IV studies the background of U.K. defamation law, the
influence of the E.U. Electronic Commerce Directive on the creation of
the U.K. Defamation Act 2013, and analyzes the pertinent sections of the
U.K. Defamation Act 2013. Part V presents a proposed solution and
framework for amending § 230 to include a federal takedown remedy.
Part V also addresses jurisdictional or other potential concerns that could
arise in response to the proposed solution.
and interplay with the CDA has "produced cries for reformation.").
11. One such problem with implementing a takedown decree is that defamation law is a
state tort remedy and therefore creating a federal remedy creates a host of enforcement problems.
12. See, e.g., Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 (U.K.); Directive 2000/31/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of June 8, 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society
Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on Electronic
Commerce') [hereinafter E.U. Electronic Commerce Directive] (directing E.U. Member States to
create a notice and takedown requirement for Internet defamation).
13. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 (U.K.); David Hooper et al., Defamation Act 2013 - What
Difference Will It Really Make?, 24 ENT. L.R. 2013, 199, 205 (2013) ("The Act is a welcome and
long overdue reform of the law of defamation.").
14. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 § 5 (U.K.).
15. Defamation Act 2013, c. 25 § 13 (U.K.).
300 [Vol. 27
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II. SECTION 230 OF THE CDA NEEDS TO BE AMENDED TO ADDRESS
THE INTERNET'S IMPACT ON U.S. DEFAMATION LAW
The Internet is a medium of communication that presents unique legal
concerns. The Internet is omnipresent throughout all facets of life in
modem society.'6 It is concerning that the CDA, which regulates the
Internet's use, has not been updated, since its passage eighteen years ago,
to address the Internet's pervasive presence.17 Accordingly, the
expansive judicial interpretation of § 230 and the scope of § 230
immunity is now too broad in light of the unique aspects of the Internet
and the growing inequities facing modem cyber defamation victims.
A. Unique Aspects of the Internet
The Internet's global presence enables easy accessibility of
information to a mass audience.18  This exponential spread of
information'9 helped create a global culture that encourages people to
impulsively share their every thought with the click of a button.'° The
Internet's function as a faceless medium creates a lack of accountability
for online communications, for which editorial control and legal
16. See Phillip Adam Davis, The Defamation of Choice-of-Law in Cyberspace: Countering
the View that the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law is Inadequate to Navigate the
Borderless Reaches of the Intangible Frontier, 54 FED. CoMM. L.J. 339, 348 (2002) ("Cyberspace
is no longer a 'new frontier,' but a fixed communication device that is commonplace and woven
into the fabric of American society.").
17. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
18. Scott Sterling, International Law of Mystery: Holding Internet Service Providers
Liable for Defamation and the Need for a Comprehensive International Solution, 21 LoY. L.A.
ENT. L. REv. 327, 347 (2001) ("[A]nything published on the Internet has the ability to reach a
worldwide audience."). Further, the rapid growth of Internet users has increased the sheer volume
of "mass" communications. MATTHEW COLLINS, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET 3
(3d ed. 2010) (The Internet "brings mass communication to the mass: anyone with a computer
and an Internet connection or, increasingly, an Intemet-enabled evice, can utilize its potential.").
19. "[T]he presently existing Internet within cyberspace functions to '[enable] people to
communicate with one another with unprecedented speed and efficiency and is rapidly
revolutionizing how people receive and share information."' Kimberly Quon, Implementing a
Standard of Care to Provide Protection from a Lawless Internet, 31 WHITTIER L. REv. 589, 606
(2010) (quoting Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 48 (D.D.C. 1998)).
20. See Kim, supra note 2, at 400-01 (commenting that impulsive posting of content is one
"regrettable online behavior" associated with modem online culture). The computer, smart phone,
or other method of Internet access serves as a shield, to embolden people to say more, than they
would in face-to-face interactions. See Jennifer Benedict, Deafening Silence: The Quest for a
Remedy in Internet Defamation, 39 CuMB. L. REv. 475, 479 (2009) ("There are no gatekeepers in
cyberspace and anyone with a computer is capable of targeting anyone else."); Doug Rendleman,
The Defamation Injunction Meets the Prior Restraint Doctrine 19 (Wash. & Lee Pub. Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2014-8, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/so]3/papers.cfrn?abstractid=2404560 ("People who previously lacked
access to widespread communication can now scream vitriol from their virtual rooftops.").
5
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regulation is difficult. 21 Further, once defamatory content appears on the
Internet, it is difficult to remove22 due to the advent of mirror websites
23
and the growing trend of ISPs to refuse to allow posters to remove
content.
24
Finally, the Internet stretches jurisdictional boundaries,25 creating
additional obstacles for cyber victims. Obtaining jurisdiction over the
author of the defamatory content or the ISP becomes almost impossible,
if neither the author nor the ISP is subject to the forum court's
jurisdiction.26 Defamation law is a state tort action, but the problem of
cyber defamation is global in scope. Consequently, recognition and
enforcement of a state tort defamation action both in the United States
and in foreign countries is problematic.27 All the characteristics that make
the Internet an appealing medium of communication, "also make [the
Internet] a devastatingly effective tool to ruin the lives of innocent
citizens."28 Thus, in light of the Internet's pervasiveness and the
expansive immunity provided to ISPs under § 230, the quantum of harm
suffered by cyber defamation victims is greater than the quantum of harm
suffered by defamation victims in other mediums of communication.
29
21. See Rendleman, supra note 20, at 19 ("Observers think that social media, like alcohol,
is disinhibiting because it undermines judgment and exacerbates impulsive and emotional
responses."); see Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn From
John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2009) [hereinafter Lidsky, John Doe].
22. Terence J. Lau, Towards Zero NetPresence, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
237, 242 (2011) ("scrubbing content becomes more and more difficult as time progresses and the
content replicates."); see Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber- Victimization, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1103, 1112 (2011) [hereinafter Lipton, Victimization] ("Even where information about
a victim is removed from one website, it may be cached and copied on other websites.").
23. Mirror websites publish "the same files, format, and HTML as the original website."
Phil Cameron, Internet Travel Purchases, 30 NO.3 GPSOLo 48,53 (2013). The purpose of a mirror
website is to ensure "the site is available from more than one location-[for] sites at risk of being
hacked or banned." John Alan Farmer, The Spector of Crypto-Anarchy: Regulating Anonymity-
Protecting-Peer-to-Peer Networks, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 725, 740-41 (2003).
24. See Kim, supra note 2, at 415-16; Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 21, at 1390.
25. See Yuval Karniel, Defamation on the Internet - A New Approach to Libel in
Cyberspace, 2 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 215, 220 (2009) (noting the Internet is "[w]ithout
geographical borders.").
26. See Barry J. Waldman, A Unified Approach to Cyber-Libel: Defamation on the
Internet, A Suggested Approach, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, *8 (1999) (noting that determining
jurisdiction for cyber-libel cases can present several difficulties for plaintiffs); Amanda Groover
Hyland, The Taming of the Internet: A New Approach to Third-Party Internet Defamation, 31
HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 79, 109 (2008) ("These problems are compounded by the wide
range of possible jurisdictions where a web operator may be called into court[.]").
27. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05; see generally Bruce D. Brown & Clarissa Pintado, The
Small Steps of the Speech Act, 54 VA. J. INT'L L. DIG. 1 (2014).
28. Lau, supra note 22, at 253.
29. See Robert D. Richards, Sex, Lies, and the Internet: Balancing First Amendment
Interests, Reputational Harm, and Privacy in the Age of Blogs and Social Networking Sites, 8
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 176, 212 (2009) ("[the] ability to disseminate potentially damaging and
[Vol. 27
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B. Defamation and the Internet
As the Internet's popularity grows, there is an increasing amount of
online defamation.30 The tort of defamation is designed to provide
remedies to defamation victims, however the application of the tort to the
Internet is inadequate because it fails to provide sufficient remedies for
cyber defamation victims.31 In order to fully understand why § 230 needs
to be amended to include a takedown remedy for cyber defamation, it is
essential to understand the tenets of defamation law, both common law
foundations and constitutional limitations, as well as current obstacles to
recovery.
1. Traditional Elements of Defamation
The defamation32 tort provides a mechanism for individuals to recover
for harm to their reputation.33 The tort reconciles "the competing interests
of freedom of expression and the protection of individual reputation."
34
In order for a plaintiff to prevail under the common law, the plaintiff had
to prove: (1) the existence of a defamatory communication;35 (2)
identification of the plaintiff to a third party;36 and (3) publication of the
communication to at least one third party.37 The United States Supreme
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan constitutionalized the tort of
false information about another to a mass audience with little more than a keystroke's worth of
effort threatens to devalue reputation to a point never before experienced in American culture.").
See also Lipton, Victimization, supra note 22, at 1116 ("Much online conduct will damage a
victim's reputation permanently with little recourse because many laws are focused on physical
world conduct rather than online communications.").
30. See Ardia, supra note 3, at 12 ("[A]necdotal evidence indicates that defamation claims
are actually increasing.").
31. See id. at 18 ("Not surprisingly, defamation plaintiffs are frustrated with the remedies
available to them.").
32. "The term 'defamation' encompasses the twin torts of libel and slander." LYRISSA
BARNETT LIDSKY & R. GEORGE WRIGHT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 63 (Jack Stark ed. 2004) [hereinafter LIDSKY, FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS].
33. See id. Moreover, "[plublic policy recognizes that individuals have the right to enjoy
their reputation, free from false attacks that tend to diminish their reputation in the eyes of the
community." Lynch, supra note 1, at 6.
34. COLLINS, supra note 18, at 4.
35. A defamatory statement is "a statement hat tends to harm an individual's reputation in
the eyes of his or her community. LIDSKY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 32, at 66. The court
will "'presume[] damages' based solely on the nature of the defamatory statements." Id.
36. Id.
37. ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 2-
70 (PLI, 3d ed. 1999). Publication occurs when defamatory words are "expressed purposely or
negligently to a third party." Id. (citing Lyons v. Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 30 F.3d 240, 244 (lst Cir.
1994)).
7
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defamation38 and added two additional elements for the plaintiff to prove:
(4) falsity of the communication;39 and (5) some type of fault of the
defendant, such as actual malice or negligence.
40
Additionally, there are three types of secondary liability in a
defamation action: publisher (re-publisher) liability, distributor liability,
and common carrier (or conduit) liability.41 Both re-publisher liability
4 2
and distributor liability 43 are relevant to the problem of cyber defamation.
The key distinction between re-publisher and distributor liability is that a
critical element for the imposition of distributor liability is a finding by
the court that the party (distributor) had notice that the statement was
defamatory.44 Yet the question when addressing cyber defamation and
ISP liability is "whether the traditional law of defamation 'fits' the
Internet.,
45
2. Obstacles to Recovery in Internet Defamation Cases
Prior to the passage of § 230 of the CDA, many legal scholars initially
believed courts would apply defamation law to the Internet in the same
manner courts applied it to all other print medium.46 This belief included
38. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
39. Id. Proving the truth of the statement used to be a defense to defamation; now proving
the statement's falsity is incorporated into the elements a plaintiff must prove. LIDSKY, FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS, supra note 32, at 74; Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
40. See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. 254. The fault of the defendant varies based on whether the
plaintiff is a public official or public figure versus a private figure. See LIDSKY, FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS, supra note 32, at 66-74.
41. Amanda Groover Hyland, The Taming of the Internet: A New Approach to Third-Party
Internet Defamation, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 79, 81 (2008) ("Those who republish a
libelous statement do not escape liability simply because they did not originally create the
content.").
42. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (Distributor liability occurs when a person
"only delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person.").
44. Id.
45. Bryan P. Werley, Aussie Rules: Universal Jurisdiction Over Internet Defamation, 18
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 199, 220-21 (2004) ("Whether the technical definition of publication
with regards to defamation can really be applied to the Internet, which is unlike anything else the
common law definition has been applied to, both in terms of its reach and the way in which it is
accessed.").
46. See Sean P. Trende, Defamation, Anti-SLAPP Legislation, & the Blogosphere: New
Solutions for an Old Problem, 44 DuQ. L. REV. 607, 619 (2006); see also Jeffrey M. Tayler,
Liability of Usenet Moderators for Defamation Published by Others: Flinging the Law of
Defamation into Cyberspace, 47 FLA. L. REV. 247, 267 (1995) (acknowledging that many legal
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the availability of traditional defamation remedies such as damages47 and
equitable relief such as an apology, a retraction of the statement, or in
limited cases an injunction.4 However, the Internet's global scope and §
230 immunity provide obstacles to the availability of remedies in cyber
defamation cases.
First, the Internet's global structure creates an obstacle to the ability
of a victim of cyber defamation to ensure the court has jurisdiction over
the claim and the parties.5 In many situations, the case begins and ends
with a determination as to whether the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate
the matter.5" Moreover, determining personal jurisdiction has proven to
be a "difficult proposition" for victims of cyber defamation52 as the test
courts use for evaluating jurisdiction differs based upon each state or
federal court.53 Thus, the ability of a court to exercise jurisdiction over a
local or foreign ISP for a state tort claim presents an obstacle to the
institution of recovery proceedings, as the Internet's reach has no set
boundaries.
Even if a court were able to assert jurisdiction over an ISP, the
remedies available for prevailing cyber defamation plaintiffs are
inadequate.54 Specifically, § 230 ISP immunity prevents plaintiffs from
joining the ISP as a party to the lawsuit.55 At best, provided the plaintiff
47. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 620-23 for a discussion of the
types of damages a defamation plaintiff could seek.
48. Id. at 11-13 ("Legislatures of thirty-three states have enacted statutes that govern the
procedure to be followed in demanding and publishing revocation."). However, there is "no
judicial authority for right of retraction absent the existence of an applicable statute." Id at 10-
56.
49. See Ardia, supra note 3, at 48-51; See generally Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 738
(2005).
50. See Ludington, supra note 8, at 543 (there is a "jurisdictional safe harbor (ironically)
provided by the very ubiquity of the Internet.").
51. Jacqueline D. Lipton, Law of the IntermediatedInformation Exchange, 64 FLA. L. REV.
1337, 1365 (2012) [hereinafter Lipton, Intermediated Information Exchange].
52. Waldman, supra note 26, at *8.'
53. Id. at *9-15 (the tests range from totality of the contacts, effects test approach, and the
Keeton test); Id. ("courts usually decline to exercise jurisdiction over interstate or foreign
defendants where the principal or only connection with the forum state is that it is the place of
residence of the plaintiff."); COLLINS, supra note 18, at 593-95 (However, courts will exercise
jurisdiction in situations where there is a manifest intent by the defendant to "target and focus on
the forum," and when "commercial and other contacts [exist] between the defendant and the forum
state.").
54. See Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 21, at 1389-90.
55. See Ardia, supra note 3, at 17 ("Unless these online intermediaries voluntarily remove
the defamatory speech, a court cannot force them to do so."); Kraig J. Marton et al., Protecting
One's Reputation - How to Clear a Name in a World Where Name Calling is so Easy, 4 PHx. L.
REv. 53, 60 (2010) ("the Communications Decency Act insulates the owners of websites from
liability for defamation, sometimes presenting unique challenges for the defamed party to get the
remedy they are seeking.").
9
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56knows the identity of the poster of the defamatory statement, a
successful plaintiff will recover damages57 and possibly a takedown
decree against the poster. However, this decree does not guarantee that
the defamatory content will be removed from the Internet, and damages
fail to adequately compensate cyber defamation victims because damages
do not restore a victim's online reputation or remove the defamatory
statement from the Internet.58
III. THE CDA
The Internet has changed dramatically since Congress enacted the
CDA. In order to fully understand why § 230 is outdated, it is important
to understand the impact it had in changing the application of defamation
law to the Internet, specifically the immunity § 230(c) provided ISPs.
A. Intent Behind the Creation of the CDA
Prior to 1996, the common law determined Internet defamation
actions, and held ISPs responsible for moderating defamatory content
posted on the website by a third party.59 As a result of the perverse
incentives created by two decisions, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.
60
and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., Congress felt
compelled to intervene and pass the CDA. 61 Both cases had similar facts
and were adjudicated within the state of New York, yet arrived at two
completely different conclusions. In the first case, Cubby, the court held
that the defendant was a distributor and therefore not liable for
defamatory remarks posted on its forum boards.62 In the second case,
56. See Lidsky, John Doe, supra note 21, at 1374.
57. Id. at 1389-90.
58. See id. ("Libel law gives successful plaintiffs compensatory and occasionally punitive
damages, remedies that are virtually meaningless when the defendant has no money to satisfy a
judgment.").
59. See Molly Sachson, The Big Bad Internet: Reassessing Service Provider Immunity
Under § 230 to Protect he Private Individual from Unrestrained Internet Communication, 25 J.
Civ. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 353, 357-58 (2011).
60. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
61. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995),
superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
62. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 141. In Cubby, defendant ISP CompuServe, provided its
subscribers access to over thousands of information services and forums. Id. at 137. One such
forum contained the publication "Rumorville USA" which plaintiffs claimed published "false and
defamatory statements" about their competing business and the individual plaintiffs. Id. at 138.
The Southern District of New York treated CompuServe as a distributor, finding that CompuServe
did not moderate or filter the content that was posted. Id. at 141. Therefore, as CompuServe did
not know or have reason to know of the defamatory content, CompuServe was not liable. Id.
[Vol. 27
10
Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol27/iss2/4
2015] REALISM ABOUT REMEDIES AND THE NEED FOR A CDA TAKEDOWN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 307
Stratton, the court held that a similarly situated defendant was a publisher
and liable for the defamatory content on its forum boards.
63
Congress was concerned with the divergent results of the above two
cases because Congress wanted to encourage ISPs to self-regulate the
dissemination of material on their websites without fear of liability. 64 To
address its concerns with the diverse incentives created by Cubby and
Stratton,65  Congress passed the Cox-Wyden Amendment to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.66 The intent of the Cox-Wyden
Amendment was to reverse the Stratton decision and to eliminate
corresponding disincentives for intermediaries to screen content.67 On
February 8, 1996, the Communication Decency Act became effective as
Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.68 The Cox-Wyden
amendment was codified as § 230-Protection for private blocking and
screening of offensive material-of the CDA. 69 The advent of § 230 was
viewed as a successful merger of Congress's goals and of ensuring the
continued growth of the Internet by providing protection for ISPs from
liability for third-party comments.
7°
B. The Ambiguity Created by § 230
In retrospect, § 230's language was ambiguous and failed to provide
63. See Stratton, 1995 WL 323710 at *1-*2. Stratton was decided four years after Cubby.
Id. In Stratton, the Supreme Court of New York, in a state court trial on facts similar to Cubby,
held defendant Prodigy liable as a publisher of the defamatory statements the plaintiff complained
were posted on one of Prodigy's bulletin boards. Id. at *1, *3, *6. The court granted the plaintiffs
motion for partial summary judgment finding Prodigy was a publisher because Prodigy and its
agents moderated the content on the bulletin boards. Id. Therefore, Prodigy was liable for any
defamatory content posted on its websites by third parties. Id. at *1.
64. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4).
65. The Cox-Wyden Amendment was also designed to address Congress's concern with
the ease of accessibility of the Internet to children, especially to pornography on the Internet. See
Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon's Communications Decency Act:
Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 52-59 (1996).
66. See Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 315-16 (2011); Cannon, supra note 65, at 67.
67. See Wu, supra note 66, at 316; 47 U.S.C. § 230.
68. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified
as 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560, 561).
69. Id.; see also Wu, supra note 66, at 315-17. Congress's goals for passing § 230 include
objectives designed "to promote the continued development of the Internet," to encourage the
development of technology, and "to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies." 47 U.S.C. § 230(b). "Congress sought to encourage
providers and users of Internet services to practice self-regulation with respect to offensive
material." Jae Hong Lee, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation Liability for Third-
Party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 470 (2004).
70. See Wu, supra note 66, at 316.
11
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guidance as to the scope of intermediary (ISP) liability. 7' The main source
of ambiguity originates in § 230(c), where Congress attempted to
structure the provision in a manner that would effectively promote self-
regulation of ISPs.72 Section 230(c), also known as the "Good Samaritan"
provision,73 was designed to give ISPs special protections from liability
for publishing third-party content.74
This additional protection for ISPs from re-publisher liability is a
protection not provided to the print or broadcast mediums.75 Section
230(c) provides a medium-specific protection and holds ISPs liable for
content that may be properly attributed to it. 76 Thus, for an ISP to be
liable, the ISP must be deemed an "information content provider"
meaning "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for
the creation or development of informationprovided through the Internet
or any other interactive computer service.
The ambiguity in § 230(c) arises in determining whether the ISP
qualifies for protection from liability, essentially whether the ISP is a
71. Id.at3l7;47U.S.C.§230.
72. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). § 230(c) provides:
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on
account of--
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability
of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers
or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in
paragraph (1).
Id.
73. In fact, § 230(c) is titled "[P]rotection for 'good samaritan' blocking and screening of
offensive material." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
74. Id. Hong Lee, supra note 69, at 470 ("The CDA was designed to encourage self-
regulation by permitting Internet service providers (ISPs) to exercise their editorial powers in
regulating offensive material without incurring strict liability for defamation as publishers of
third-party content.").
75. See Ardia, supra note 3, at 10-11 ("More recently, defamation law took on a decidedly
medium-specific aspect when Congress passed § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which
granted operators and users of websites and other interactive computer services broad protection
from defamation claims based on the speech of third parties.").
76. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
77. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
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publisher78 or "responsible" for the "creation or development" of the
disputed defamatory content.7 9 This determination is relevant because the
language of § 230 only addresses publishers, and makes no reference
whatsoever to "distributors."80 Despite the confusion surrounding
whether § 230(c) also included distributors, Congress neither amended
§ 230(c) nor provided guidance as to what the definition of "publisher"
encompassed.
C. Judicial Interpretation of§ 230(c)-A Divergence from Congress's
Underlying Objective and the Creation of Immunity for Both
Publishers and Distributors
The burden fell to the courts to interpret § 230(c) and the courts have
broadly interpreted the scope of § 230(c) immunity.
81
1. Zeran v. America Online, Inc.
A court first addressed the ambiguity of § 230(c)(1) in the seminal
case of Zeran v. America Online, Inc. 82 In Zeran, the plaintiff Ken Zeran
was the victim of an "unidentified third party's hoax" posting on an AOL
bulletin board advertising the sale of "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts," six
days after the April 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.83 Following this
"anonymously perpetrated prank," Zeran received a "high volume" of
angry phone calls. 4 Zeran notified an AOL representative of the hoax
and was assured the post would be removed, however additional
messages continued to be posted on AOL boards and the harassment
continued.85 Zeran ultimately filed suit against AOL seeking to hold AOL
liable as a distributor for the defamatory content posted by a third party.
8 6
78. See Quon, supra note 19, at 597.
79. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
80. Id.
81. See Sachson, supra note 60, at 359. In fact, "courts have treated § 230(c) immunity as
quite robust, adopting a relatively expansive definition of 'interactive computer service' and a
relatively restrictive definition of 'information content provider."' See Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Sachson, supra note 59, at
360.
82. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
83. Id. at 329. The shirts featured "offensive and tasteless slogans" about the Oklahoma
City bombing. Id. The hoax message instructed "those interested in purchasing a shirt to call" Ken
and provided Zeran's phone number. Id
84. Id. Zeran could not change his phone number to avoid the harassing phone calls
because his phone number's availability was critical to "running his business out of his home."
Id.
85. Id.
86. Zeran was unable to bring any "action against the party who posted the offensive
messages," because the party's identity was unknown. Id. Zeran alleged that once "he notified
13
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AOL asserted § 230 as an affirmative defense, and the district court
granted AOL's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which Zeran
appealed.87
The Fourth Circuit examined § 230 and held that "[b]y its plain
language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make [ISPs] liable for information originating with a third-party
user of the service."88 Accordingly, the court concluded that § 230(c)(1)
"forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a[n] [ISP] for the exercise
of its editorial and self-regulatory functions."8 9 The court also rejected
Zeran's argument that § 230 left "distributor liability intact."90 The
Fourth Circuit held that distributor liability is "merely a subset, or a
species, of publisher liability, and is therefore also precluded by § 230."'91
Consequently, the court affirmed AOL's motion for judgment on the
pleadings as it found that AOL fell "squarely" within the definition of
publisher and was protected by § 230 from suit.
92
The Fourth Circuit's analysis and interpretation of § 230 in Zeran has
been extoled as clarifying the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of
§ 230(c), specifically the meaning of "publisher" for purposes of
§ 230(c)(1).93 Zeran established a broad immunity for ISPs under
§ 230(c)(1), protecting service providers from virtually all liability for
content "originating with third parties."94 Moreover, the Zeran opinion
set the basic foundation for distributor immunity by holding that the term
"publisher" in § 230(c)(1) encompassed liability protection for both
publishers and distributors.95 Zeran remains the leading case on
intermediary immunity.
96
AOL of the unidentified third party's hoax, AOL had a duty to remove the defamatory posting
promptly, to notify its subscribers of the message's false nature, and to effectively screen future
defamatory material." Id. at 330.
87. Id. at 329-30.
88. Id. at 330. The Fourth Circuit also recognized that Congress's purpose in enacting §
230 was to reverse the Stratton decision. Id.
89. Id. at 331.
90. Id. at 332.
91. Id. In rejecting Zeran's notice liability argument, the court found that "liability upon
notice would defeat the dual purposes advanced by § 230 of the CDA" because such notice
liability would deter service providers from self-regulating and increase incentives to restrict
speech. Id. at 333.
92. Id. at 332.
93. Id.
94. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332-33; Mark D. Quist, "Plumbing the Depths" of the CDA:
Weighing the Competing Fourth and Seventh Circuit Standards of ISP Immunity Under Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act, 20 GEO MASON L. REV. 275, 288 (2012).
95. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332-33.
96. See David Lukmire, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act? The
Reverberations of Zeran v. American Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 371, 385 (2010)
("Zeran laid the groundwork for future expansive readings of section 230."); Varty Defterderian,
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2. Post-Zeran and § 230 Immunity
Zeran created a national standard for the interpretation of § 230(c).
Since Zeran, a majority of courts have followed its analysis.97 Courts in
the First,98 Second,99 Third,'00 Fourth,'
0' Fifth,'02 Seventh,0 3 Eighth,10 4
Ninth,05 Tenth,10 6 and Eleventht0 7 Circuits have followed Zeran's
holding and provided broad immunity to ISPs protecting them from both
publisher and distributor liability.1
0 8
The courts developed a three-prong test to determine ISP immunity
from liability pursuant to § 230(c)(1).10 9 To be afforded § 230(c)(1)
protection, the ISP must prove that: (1) the defendant website provider is
an "interactive computer service" within the meaning of § 230(0(2)110;
(2) the plaintiff is seeking to hold the defendant website provider liable
as the publisher;' and (3) the information was "provided by another
Fair Housing Council v. Roommates. corn: A New Path for Section 230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 563, 570 (2009) ("Zeran remains the preeminent case on section 230 immunity.").
97. Notably, due to § 230 immunity protecting ISPs, there has been limited cyber
defamation litigation reaching the federal circuit court level. Of the seventy federal circuit court
cases that quote some portion of § 230, forty-five of the cases reference § 230(c)(1). Search of
Westlaw database, March 24, 2015. Twenty-seven federal circuit court cases quote Zeran. Search
of Westlaw database, March 24, 2015.
98. Universal Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, 478 F.3d 413,417, 422 (1st Cir. 2007).
99. Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, No. 14-1732, 2015 WL 1214476 (2d Cir. Mar.
11, 2015) (noting that the court was going to join the consensus of other courts that have applied
to immunity provisions of the Communications Decency Act to a growing list of Internet-based
service providers).
100. DiMeo v. Max, 248 Fed. Appx. 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2007); Green v. Am. Online, 318
F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003).
101. Nemet Chevrolet v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009).
102. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008).
103. Chicago Lawyers Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666 (7th Cir. 2008); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
104. See Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010).
105. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2009); see Batzel v.
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003).
106. See F.T.C. v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2009); Ben Ezra,
Weinstein & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000).
107. Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Venture, LLC, 199 F. App'x 738, 739-40
(11 th Cir. 2006); see Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2006).
108. "Circuit courts have interpreted the CDA to broadly immunize almost all interactive
website operators from defamation actions stemming from third-party content." Andrew
Bluebond, When the Customer is Wrong: Defamation, Interactive Websites, and Immunity, 33
REV. LIG. 679, 684 (2014).
109. See Matthew G. Jeweler, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230 is
Outdated and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should be Reinstated Against Internet Service
Providers, 8 U. Plrr. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 3 (2007).
110. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), ()(2).
I 11. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
15
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information content provider" within the meaning of § 230(f)(3).112 The
Zeran opinion has become firmly entrenched with the analysis of § 230.
Not only has Zeran influenced and shaped CDA case law, it has turned §
230(c)(1) into a formidable obstacle for cyber defamation plaintiffs to
overcome. 
1 13
D. Growing Dissatisfaction with the Broad Interpretation of§ 230
Section 230 falls short of accomplishing Congress's goal of
encouraging ISPs to self-regulate. Although Congress assumed ISPs
would engage in self-regulation, as § 230 does not require ISPs to self-
regulate and protects ISPs from liability if they do not, Congress's goal
of ISP self-regulation has not been achieved.14 As one commentator
noted, "[t]he conferral of section 230 immunity has led to egregious
results, which make a mockery of the term good Samaritan when applied
to certain websites."
' 15
First, there is disagreement over the language of § 230 and whether
the term "publisher" in § 230(c)(1) actually includes distributor
liability. 116 On one side, judicial interpretation, starting with the Fourth
Circuit's holding in Zeran, ignores the fact that the text of § 230 makes
"no separate reference to distributors."''7 By disregarding Congress's
decision to exclude "distributors" from the language of § 230, the courts
have created a broad general immunity for ISPs that was not explicitly
mentioned in § 230's text." 8 Critics of the Zeran interpretation note that
one of Congress's express reasons for passing § 230 was to reverse the
112. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (0(3).
113. See Ken S. Myers, Wikkimunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to
Wikipedia, 20 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 163, 174 (2006) (noting the "expanding scope of § 230(c)(1)'s
application to various potential 'gatekeepers' of Internet content ....").
114. See Sewali K. Patel, Immunizing Internet Service Providers From Third-Party Internet
Defamation Claims: How Far Should Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 678 (2002).
115. Kim, supra note 2, at 398.
116. See Quist, supra note 94, at 287-88. In addition to the disagreement over the scope of
the term publisher, circuit courts have split over whether "the defense established by § 230(c)(1)
is properly understood as an 'immunity' defense." See Hare v. Richie, No. ELH-1 1-3488, 2012
WL 3773116, at *14 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2012) (comparing Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791
(8th Cir. 2010) and Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc. 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (1 1th Cir. 2006) with City
of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) and Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570
F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009)).
117. See Quist, supra note 94, at 287-88; Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332-33
(4th Cir. 1997).
118. See Quist, supra note 94, at 287-89. The statute merely states that § 230(c) is a defense
to liability. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). Yet the Zeran opinion "suggests that the grant of immunity is
not only implied, but explicitly envisioned by the plain meaning of the language of Section
230(c)(1)." Quist, supra note 94, at 289.
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Stratton decision and preclude publisher liability.119 Thus, Congress's
failure to include distributor liability in the language of § 230
demonstrates an intent to leave distributor liability as the only available
form of ISP secondary liability.
Section 230 created an environment in which the ISP can hold
dichotomous roles and use each classification to its advantage. 120 As one
commentator observed, ISPs are able to "exploit inflexible and
dichotomous regulatory classifications to qualify as both creators and
managers of content, and as intentionally neutral conduits of content
created by others. With nimble maneuvering, ISPs can toggle between
claiming First Amendment-protected speaker rights and invoking 'safe
harbor' exemptions from liability for the content they carry."'12 Section
230 immunity provides ISPs an unfair advantage, the ability to utilize the
classification that best suits its needs to the injured party's detriment. 
122
Moreover, there are limited avenues for relief under § 230, making
§ 230's application and remedies in comparison to other laws governing
the Internet. 23 For example, other federal statutes provide notice and
takedown remedies while also protecting the ISPs from liability.
124
Finally, the absence of a takedown provision in § 230 effectively creates
a wall of immunity around harmful speech. By immunizing ISPs from
liability and from the equitable relief of an injunction, § 230 enables the
defamatory statements to remain online even after they have been found
defamatory, becoming a statutory shield for wrongful conduct. In this
manner, the ISP becomes a vehicle for permanent dissemination of the
defamatory content. Accordingly, an amendment is needed to update §
230 to address the Internet's landscape and growing dissatisfaction with
the ambiguity of § 230(c) immunity.
119. See Cannon, supra note 65, at 63.
120. See Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the First Amendment: How Internet Service
Providers Leverage Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral Conduits, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1279, 1281 (2010).
121. Id.
122. See Lipton, Intermediated Information Exchange, supra note 51, at 1355 (noting the
need to refocus the cyberlaw field to create an effective framework for remedying the "facially
disparate areas of law like intermediary liability for defamation.").
123. For example § 230 is inconsistent with 17 U.S.C. § 512, the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA). Compare 47 U.S.C. § 230, with 17 U.S.C. § 512. The DMCA,
which was drafted around the same time as the CDA, also includes a safe harbor from liability for
ISPs provided the ISP complies with the notice and takedown provision of § 512(c). 17 U.S.C. §
512(c).
124. Under the DMCA, ISPs still receive protection from liability for user-generated
content; however the DCMA provides victims of copyright infringement with sufficient avenues
to remedy the infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 512. In comparison, there are limited avenues for
relief under § 230 for victims of cyber defamation.
17
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IV. THE INTERNET, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND DEFAMATION LAW
Examining the relationship between defamation law and the Internet
in countries such as the United Kingdom is "of critical importance" to
proposing an amendment o § 230 of the CDA because of the Internet's
global scope.25 Of particular interest to the United States is the newly
passed U.K. Defamation Act 2013, which became effective January
2014. The Act was designed to amend the previous defamation statute
and address several concerns that had arisen with the increase in
popularity of the Internet. Before analyzing the Act, it is important to
understand the interplay between the U.K. laws and the European Union
Electronic Commerce Directive prior to the passage of the U.K.
Defamation Act 2013.
A. The 1996 U.K. Defamation Act and the European Union Electronic
Commerce Directive
In 1996, the same year Congress passed § 230 of the CDA, the United
Kingdom codified the Defamation Act of 1996 (1996 U.K. Act).126 The
1996 Act did not contain any provisions addressing the Internet or
ISPs.127 However, four years after the 1996 U.K. Act came into effect,
the European Union set forth its Legislation Directive on Electronic
Commerce.'28 The European Union's purpose in creating the Electronic
Commerce Directive was "to remove obstacles to cross-border provision
of on-line services in the Internal Market and to provide legal certainty to
businesses and citizens."129 To further this goal, Articles 12 to 14 of the
Directive established "precisely defined limitations on the liability of
intermediary service providers who offer mere conduit, caching and
hosting."'
130
Specifically, Article 14(1) created a safe harbor provision from
liability for ISPs.13' Under the safe harbor provision, an ISP would be
125. GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, § 11.04 DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET
AROUND THE WORLD (3d ed. 2013).
126. Defamation Act, 1996, c. 31 (U.K.). Prior to the enactment of the 1996 U.K.
Defamation Act, defamation law in the United Kingdom was defined solely by common law. See
DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 125, at 1.
127. Defamation Act, 1996, c. 31 (U.K.).
128. E.U. Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 13. The European Union Electronic
Commerce Directive contained numerous findings relating to ISPs, liability, and the Member
States. Id. at 45, 46, 52, 64.
129. Study on the Liability of Intermediaries, at 4 (Nov. 12, 2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final-report-en.pdf.
130. Id.
131. Article 14(1) provides in pertinent part:
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage
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immune from liability if the ISP complied with the notice-and-takedown
requirements of the Directive.132 This safe harbor provision and the 2000
E.U. Directive as a whole altered the application of laws governing ISP
liability within each E.U. Member State, including the United
Kingdom.'33 In 2012, the U.K. courts essentially adopted the safe harbor
provisions of Article 14(1) in Tamiz v. Google, where the court held that
Google could face potential liability as a publisher for failing to take
down defamatory content after receiving notice that the content was
defamatory.134 The Tamiz decision changed the U.K. standard for ISP
liability by deeming the ISP a publisher and subject to liability for
allegedly defamatory content if"it fails to take action within a reasonable
time after the complaining party notifies it."
135
B. The "New" U.K. Defamation Act of2013
The widespread growth of the Internet combined with the requirement
to comply with the E.U. Directive culminated in the U.K. Parliament
amending the 1996 U.K. Act.'3 6 In April 2013, the new U.K. Defamation
Act of 2013 (2013 U.K. Act) passed by Royal Assent.137 The 2013 U.K.
of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure
that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of
a recipient of the service, on condition that:
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information
and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from
which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.
See E.U. Electronic Commerce Directive, supra note 12, art. 14(1).
132. Id.
133. See id. Because the E.U. Directive is a form of legislation governing its Member States,
the Directive sets the floor for the laws in Member States. Application of EU Law: Directives
Definition, (June 11, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/eulaw/directives/directivesen.htm. The
Member States are subsequently tasked with enacting or amending laws to remain in compliance
with the Directive; however, the Directive is the minimum the Member States have to meet. See
KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW, 88-90 (Publ'n Office of the
European Union 2010), available at http://europa.eu/documentation/legislation/pdf/oa8107147_
en.pdf.
134. See Tamiz v. Google Inc., [2012] EWHC 449 (QB).
135. Id.; DELTA& MATSURA, supra note 125.[quote not found in article]
136. See Jennifer Agate, The Defamation Act 2013 - Key Changes for Online, C.T.L.R.
2013, 19(6), 170-71 (2014) [unable to find source] ("The Act also introduces two new defences
for online publishers, a recognition of the unique nature of online publication and an apparent
attempt to place more responsibility on the authors of web posts, a group who (with a few notable
exceptions) have until recently been fairly confident of their untouchability.").
137. Defamation Act, 2013, c. 26 (U.K.).
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Act's relevant changes to the existing defamation law include a tightening
of the requirements for plaintiffs to prevail on a defamation claim and an
incorporation of the E.U. Directive safe harbor provision.138 Sections 5
and 13 of the 2013 U.K. Act are particularly relevant for U.S. proposals
to amend § 230 of the CDA to address cyber misconduct.
Notably, the U.K. tailored the act to address cyber defamation by
adding a section pertaining solely to website operators.'39 Section 5 of the
2013 U.K. Act, titled "Operators of Websites" is applicable when "an
action for defamation is brought against the operator of a website in
respect of a statement posted on the website."'140 Similar to the CDA,
Section 5 provides website operators increased protection from
defamation liability for user-generated content by creating a defense from
liability. 141 Under Section 5, the website operator bears the burden of
proving that the defamatory content was user-generated; and if the
website operator meets this burden, then the website operator is entitled
to a defense from liability. 142 However, the defense provided to website
operators under Section 5 is a conditional defense and is "defeated" if the
plaintiff proves that:
(a) it was not possible for the claimant to identify the person who
posted the statement,
(b) the claimant gave the reporter a notice of complaint143 in
relation to the statement, and
(c) the operator failed to respond to the notice of complaint in
accordance with any provision contained in regulations. 1
44
The United Kingdom further tailored the 2013 U.K. Act to address the
unique problem of cyber defamation with Section 13 of the Act.
145
Section 13 provides courts with the authority to enforce a takedown
decree for defamatory content against website operators.' 46 Section 13(1)
provides:
138. See id.; Corey Omer, Intermediary Liability for Harmful Speech: Lessons From
Abroad, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 289, 309 (2014) (noting that the "2013 Defamation Act clarified
and made several significant changes to the law on intermediary liability for defamatory content
in the U.K.").
139. See Defamation Act, 2013, c. 26, § 5 (U.K.).
140. Defamation Act, 2013, c. 26, § 5(1) (U.K.)
141. See Defamation Act, 2013, c. 26, § 5(2) (U.K.).
142. Defamation Act, 2013, c. 26, § 5 (U.K.).
143. Defamation Act, 2013, c. 26, § 5(3) (U.K.). Section 5(6) of the 2013 U.K. Act sets out
what needs to be included in a notice of complaint. Defamation Act, 2013, c. 26, § 5(6) (U.K.).
144. Defamation Act, 2013, c. 26, § 5(3) (U.K.).
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Where a court gives a judgment for the claimant in an action for
defamation the court may order -
(a) the operator of a website on which the defamatory statement
is posted to remove the statement, or
(b) any person who was not the author, editor or publisher of the
defamatory statement to stop distributing, selling or
exhibiting material containing the statement. 
147
Under Section 13, the court's authority to enforce a takedown decree
against the website operator is not triggered until the court has entered a
judgment in the plaintiffs favor by finding the content defamatory.
Section 13 also enables the court to order the website operator to
takedown defamatory content in situations where the author of the
defamatory content "may not always be in a position to remove or prevent
further dissemination of material which has been found to be
defamatory."'148 Thus, Section 13 promotes efficiency in responding to
and remedying the harm caused by the defamatory content because it
enables courts to enter "an order for removal of the material to be made
during or shortly after the conclusion of proceedings."'
149
C. Potential Areas of Concern for the United States
With its enactment, the 2013 U.K. Act brought renewed attention
worldwide to amending laws governing cyber misconduct, specifically
cyber defamation.'50 Although the 2013 U.K. Act has provided a
framework for updating cyber laws, there are several sections of the 2013
U.K. Act that would prove problematic application in the United States.
First, although U.K. and U.S. defamation law are derived from the
same base common law principles, each respective country places
different weight and importance on the fundamental interests of free
speech and reputation. In the United Kingdom, an individual's reputation
interest is valued above the interests of free speech, whereas in the United
States, free speech interests are valued above an individual's reputation
interests.
151
147. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 13(1) (U.K.).
148. See comment 76 to Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 13 (U.K.).
149. Id.
150. The 2013 U.K. Act is a product of the concerted U.K. effort to update U.K. defamation
law to properly account for the increased prevalence of the Internet as a modem day medium of
communication. It has drawn attention to the account for the unique qualities and the
pervasiveness of the Internet.
151. See DELTA & MATSURA, supra note 125. The differing emphasis placed on the free
speech and reputation values has led the U.S. to view the U.K. defamation law as a mechanism
for individuals to silence critics as opposed to protecting free speech and an open marketplace of
21
Bennis: Realism About Remedies and the Need for a CDA Takedown: A Compara
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W
Additionally, under U.K. defamation law, the burden is placed on the
defendant to prove the three elements of the defense to defamation. 152 In
comparison, under U.S. common law defamation, the burden is placed on
the plaintiff to prove that "the defendant was not an innocent
disseminator."'53 Thus, where the 2013 U.K. Act does provide a defense
for ISPs like § 230 does, the U.K. allocation of the burden of proof would
not be well received in the United States.
154
Finally, there is some ambiguity in the 2013 U.K. Act that needs
clarification. Similar to the ambiguity in § 230 surrounding the meaning
of the word "publisher,"'155 the 2013 U.K. Act does not define the term
"website operator."'' 5 6 The failure to define website operator under the
2013 U.K. Act could create ambiguity as to whether any social media
website or ISP could qualify for the conditional defense from liability
pursuant to Section 5 of the Act.
157
Despite the potential concern U.S. law and policy makers might have
with the 2013 U.K. Act, there is one section, which adequately addresses
the defamation victim's underlying goal of removing the defamatory
material from the Internet. Section 13 of the 2013 U.K. Act provides the
ideas and discourse. See Sterling, supra note 18, at 338-40.
152. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 (U.K.); see Sterling, supra note 18, at 338-40.
153. See DELTA & MATSURA, supra note 125, at 2.
154. In a similar vein, the Section 5 defense afforded website operators is conditioned upon
the website operator identifying the third-party poster to the plaintiff pursuant to a notice request.
See Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 5 (U.K.). Specifically, the website operator would have to
provide the plaintiff "sufficient information to bring proceedings against the" unidentified third
party poster. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 5(4) (U.K.). This approach to providing a website
operator defense from liability would not be feasible in the United States because it encourages
website operators to disclose an unidentified poster's identity to the plaintiff. This would not only
encroach on First Amendment interests, it could also have a chilling effect on free speech.
155. Cf 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
156. See Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 5 (U.K.); DELTA & MATSURA, supra note 125, at 9;
Farrer & Co, A Quick Guide to the Defamation Act 2013, ENT. L.R. 2014, 25(2), 55-60 (2014).
It is notable that key terms including "operators" and "posted on the website" are
not satisfactorily defined, a situation not helped by the fact that the legislation
uses relatively old-fashioned terms at a time when a lot of user generated content
is nowadays published via mobile platforms and apps.
Id.
157. See Farrer & Co., supra note 156.
It seems likely that there will be litigation over the scope of s.5. For example,
will a website that temporarily suspends access to and later reinstates a post be
determined to have posted the content? Further, who is the operator, the owner
of the website, the ISP, the body with day to day control over its functions or two
or more of these three?
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courts with equitable power to enforce an injunction and takedown of the
defamatory content following a judgment in plaintiff's favor after a trial
on the merits.158 It is this Section that Congress should focus on in
drafting an amendment o § 230 of the CDA.
Moreover, if the United States creates a takedown notice provision
then there will be a somewhat consistent application of this specific
equitable remedy requirement for ISPs in the United States, United
Kingdom, and E.U. Member States. This would be a positive step towards
creating uniformity of laws and expectations pertaining to ISP liability in
this multi-jurisdictional, global Internet.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: AMEND § 230 TO INCLUDE A FEDERAL
TAKEDOWN REMEDY
As the use of the Internet as a primary medium of communication
continues to grow, there is growing dissatisfaction with the safe harbor
provision of § 230 of the CDA and the blanket immunity provided to ISPs
from virtually all lawsuits.159 With this growing dissatisfaction, legal
scholars have recognized the need to amend § 230 to provide a takedown
remedy for cyber defamation victims, yet no scholar has addressed the
practicalities of implementing a federal takedown remedy for a state tort
action. The CDA is the only federal statute that impedes the ability of
victims of cyber misconduct to obtain an appropriate remedy. Thus,
although other aspects of § 230 need to be updated, at a minimum §
230(c) needs to be amended to permit equitable relief such as a takedown
remedy for victims of cyber misconduct, specifically cyber defamation.
The solution this paper proposes would provide a practical mechanism
for victims of cyber misconduct to enforce a takedown remedy against
ISPs throughout all U.S. jurisdictions without subjecting ISPs to civil
liability.
A. Jurisdictional Concerns
The crux of the problem facing proposed amendments to § 230 is that
there is no federal defamation law. Absent a federal defamation law,
challenges arise as to the enforcement of state court orders outside of the
state, especially when the ISP is not a party to the lawsuit. The Supreme
Court addressed this precise issue in Baker by Thomas v. General Motors
Corp. 1
60
158. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 13 (U.K.).
159. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 2; Horton, supra note 10; Quon, supra note 19; Jeweler,
supra note 109.
160. Baker by Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
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In Baker, the Court was faced with determining whether an injunction
issued in the state of Michigan should be recognized and enforced
pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause in other states.'6' The Court
distinguished between the credit owed by states to judgments and to
mechanisms for enforcing judgments.162 It held that for judgments, "the
full faith and credit obligation is exacting."'63 A "final judgment in one
State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject
matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition
throughout the land... [thus] the judgment of the rendering state gains
nationwide force."'
164
Although a judgment against a party would be recognized throughout
the nation pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Court
acknowledged that the question of enforcing an injunction or other
equitable decree was still unanswered. The Court noted that equity
decrees still fall within the purview of the "full faith and credit
domain."165 However, the enforcement of ajudgment or equitable decree
does not have credit nationwide,166 "such measures remain subject to the
evenhanded control of forum law."'167 The Court concluded that the
Michigan injunction would not have full faith and credit nationwide,
because the Michigan court lacked authority to "command obedience" in
other states against parties not subject to the Michigan lawsuit or to the
jurisdiction of the court. 
168
If Congress amended § 230 to allow courts in cyber defamation claims
to issue takedown decrees for ISPs after a finding in plaintiff's favor, the
question then presented is how would a state court judgment and
injunction be enforced against an ISP when the ISP is not party to the suit
and potentially when the ISP is domiciled in a sister state? Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion in Baker addressed this exact dilemma.169 Justice
Scalia noted that "[n]o execution can issue upon such judgments without
161. Id. at 226.
162. Id. at 232.
163. Id. at 232-33.
164. Id. at 233.
165. Id. at 234 ("Equity decrees for the payment of money have long been considered
equivalent to judgments at law entitled to nationwide recognition.").
166. See id.
167. Id. at 235 ("Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that States must adopt the
practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments.");
see McElmoyle exrel. Bailey v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 325 (1839).
168. Id. at 239-41 (citing Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 282-83 (1980)
("Full faith and credit must be given to [a] determination that [a State's tribunal] had the authority
to make; but by a parity of reasoning, full faith and credit need not be given to determinations that
it had no power to make.")).
169. Id. at 241-42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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a new suit in the tribunals of other States."'170 Further, Justice Scalia stated
that for a state court judgment to be effective in a sister state, "it must be
made a judgment there; and can only be executed in the latter as its laws
may permit."'
171
Therefore, numerous jurisdiction and enforcement obstacles would
arise when enforcing a state tort defamation judgment and subsequent
injunctive takedown order in other states against ISPs not party to the
underlying defamation action. Moreover, it would be tedious to create a
statutory remedy that requires the successful plaintiff to go into each
individual state court and domesticate the original court takedown order
to have the other state courts enforce it.
B. The Interplay Between the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Full
Faith and Credit Statute
Before the solution this Article proposes can be fully understood and
set out, it is important to understand how the interplay between the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 the Full
Faith and Credit Statute, factor into and assist the successful enforcement
of a federal takedown remedy.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, Article IV § .1 of the Constitution of
the United States, provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to. . . . judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such ...
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.,172 In June of 1948,
Congress used the authority granted to it under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to enact the Full Faith and Credit Statute.'73 The Full Faith and
Credit Statute provides that:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such
State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, .. . shall have the
same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in
the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they
are taken. 1
74
Congress established, via 28 U.S.C. § 1738, a federal statute
170. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 462-63 (1873)).
171. Id. at 242 (quoting Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183, 187 (1901)); see McElmoyle ex rel.
Bailey at 325.
172. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
174. Id.
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mandating that judgments of state courts shall have nationwide force.17 5
Therefore, a judgment issued by a state court will be recognized by state
and by federal courts.'
76
When an issue reaches a federal court, the court is required to give the
state judgment the same force and effect it has in the state in which it was
rendered, including preclusive effect in any future proceeding or
action. 177 While the courts are required to give the judgment full faith and
credit, they are still not required to give full faith and credit to
enforcement measures.178 Thus, an equitable decree such as a takedown
remedy is binding and enforceable throughout the United States, only if
a federal court issues it.
179
C. Amend § 230 to Include a Federal Takedown Remedy Provision
After examining the current state of Internet defamation law,
Congress's goals behind § 230 of the CDA and the inequities victims of
cyber misconduct face, the only practical solution is to amend § 230 to
add a section creating a federal takedown remedy. This federal takedown
remedy will not interfere with an ISP's protection from civil liability;
instead, it will enable successful defamation plaintiffs' 80 to enforce a
takedown remedy in federal court against the ISPs.
There are two possible methods by which a Federal Takedown
Remedy Provision could be added to § 230 of the CDA. The federal
takedown remedy provision could be added as a new subpart of § 230(c)
the Good Samaritan provision. However, adding the federal takedown
remedy provision as a new subpart to § 230(c) would add more confusion
to an already ambiguous provision. The second option, adding a
completely new provision to § 230, would be the most practical method
of adding a federal takedown remedy provision to the CDA. The creation
of a new provision under § 230 would not only assist cyber defamation
plaintiffs in achieving the true remedy they desire, takedown of the
defamatory content, it also updates § 230 to account for the unique
aspects of the Internet.
A full version of the proposed draft of the Federal Takedown Remedy
Provision is attached as Appendix A. The major focus, aside from





179. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738. An equitable decree issued by a federal court will not encounter
the enforcement problem discussed in Baker for state court equitable decrees. Compare 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738, with Baker by Thomas, 522 U.S. at 239-41.
180. By successful defamation plaintiffs, I am referring to plaintiffs in situations where a
judge has adjudicated the content defamatory.
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takedown decree will have nationwide enforcement subject to federal
jurisdiction. In adding a Federal Takedown Remedy to § 230 of the CDA,
the majority of the statute would remain unchanged. The only change to
the pre-existing language would be to § 230(c) to add a reference to the
federal takedown remedy of § 230(g). This would incorporate the new
provision so there would not be confusion as to whether § 230(c) or the
new § 230(g) applied.
The new provision, the proposed federal takedown remedy of § 230(g)
bestows jurisdiction upon the federal district courts to grant and enforce
an injunction, a takedown decree, against an interactive computer service.
Proposed § 230(g)(1) provides:
(g)(1) Takedown Process: to qualify for the federal takedown
remedy:
(A) The plaintiff shall file a suit for defamation in the appropriate
state court against the author or poster of the defamatory statement.
No later than the third day after service of process on the author or
poster, the plaintiff shall request the court to issue a Notice of
Action and Right to Intervene to the interactive computer service.
(i) The plaintiffs complaint shall include the following:
(1) the identity and address of the interactive computer service;
(2) a Notice of Action and Right to Intervene addressed to the
interactive computer service;
(3) reference the plaintiffs intent to file for the takedown remedy
pursuant to this section of § 230 after the conclusion of a trial in
plaintiffs favor; and
(4) the plaintiffs request for a referral to the district court if the
plaintiff prevails.
(ii) The Notice of Action and Right to Intervene shall include the
following:
(1) a copy of the complaint;
(2) a statement that plaintiff seeks to enforce a takedown decree
pursuant to this section of § 230 after the conclusion of a trial in
plaintiffs favor;
(3) a statement hat the interactive computer service has the right
to intervene; and
(4) inform the interactive computer service of a deadline to
intervene which shall be no later than the 20th day after the date
27
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that the interactive computer service is served with the notice of
Action and Right to Intervene.
(iii) The Interactive Computer Service's Right to Intervene. If the
interactive computer service elects to intervene, then the
interactive computer service shall file a notice to intervene and a
motion to remove the case to the appropriate district court pursuant
to this statute.
(B) If the interactive computer service does not intervene, then the
state court case proceeds without the interactive computer service
as a party. If the plaintiff prevails and a judgment is entered in
plaintiffs factor, then the plaintiff may qualify for the takedown
remedy.
(C) If the plaintiff prevails, the plaintiff may register the state court
judgment with the appropriate district court. The plaintiff shall file
a motion in the district court requesting the court to recognize the
state court judgment and issue a takedown decree directing the
interactive computer service to takedown the defamatory
statement(s) pursuant to this provision of § 230.
Under proposed § 230(g)(1)(a), the plaintiff is required to provide
notice of intent to assert the federal takedown remedy pursuant to the
statute or they may be precluded from qualifying for and enforcing the
federal takedown remedy. With the notice and right to intervene aspect
of § 230(g)(1)(A), if the interactive computer service (ISP) elects to
intervene, then the matter will be removed to district court bringing the
matter directly under federal jurisdiction. The next provision
§ 230(g)(1)(B) requires the plaintiff prevail on the state court defamation
claim. This provision would ensure that a court has determined the speech
is defamatory and thus no longer subject to First Amendment protection
before the order of takedown. Then under § 230(g)(1)(C), if a plaintiff
prevails, the plaintiff is able to register the judgment with the appropriate
district court pursuant to the terms of this federal takedown statute. By
registering the judgment, the state court judgment turns into a federal
judgment and corresponding federal injunction, enforceable in the United
States.
Proposed § 230(g)(2) provides the safe harbor provisions to provide
ISPs with defenses from monetary liability in keeping with the overall
spirit of § 230, it provides:




Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol27/iss2/4
2015] REALISMABOUTREMED1ESAND THE NEED FOR A CDA TAKEDOWN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 325
(A) If the interactive computer service permits users to delete and
edit content after the user has posted the content on the website,
then the interactive computer service is not subject to this
provision of § 230 and is afforded the protection under § 230(c).
(B) If the interactive computer service, upon receipt of Notice of
Action and Right to Intervene from (1)(a), elects not to intervene,
the interactive computer service may consent in writing to
takedown the defamatory content should a judgment be entered in
plaintiff's favor. If the interactive computer service files its written
consent in the state court and takes down the defamatory content
after it receives notice of a judgment in plaintiff's favor, then the
interactive computer service is not subject to this provision of §
230 and is afforded the protection under § 230(c). If the interactive
computer service fails to takedown the defamatory content, no
later than the 20th day after notice of judgment is received, then
the interactive computer services is not protected from the federal
takedown remedy and the plaintiff may register the judgment with
the appropriate district court.
(C) This provision shall not subject an interactive computer service
to monetary relief. However, if the interactive computer service
fails to comply with a takedown decree pursuant to this section,
the interactive computer service shall be held in contempt and
subject to monetary sanctions.
Section 230(2)(A) provides that if the ISP enables its users to have
editorial control, then the state court will be able to issue an injunction
against the poster to have the defamatory content taken down. Further §
230(g)(2)(B), promotes efficiency by enabling the ISP to save costs by
allowing them to provide notice of intent to comply in writing after they
receive notice of a judgment in plaintiff's favor. The ISP will not have to
intervene, and so long as they comply within the specified time, they will
not be subject to the federal takedown and will be immune from liability.
However, if the ISP fails to comply within the specified time period, then
the plaintiff can proceed under the terms of the statute by registering the
judgment in district court. Finally, § 230(g)(2)(C) includes a statement
reiterating that the section only subjects ISPs to takedown decrees
without opening the door for monetary liability. The only caveat is that if
the ISP fails to comply with the federal injunction, it would be subject to
the court's contempt power, which includes a monetary fine.
Instituting a federal takedown remedy in a manner similar to the one
proposed above will ensure that a prevailing plaintiff is able to enforce a
29
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judgment for cyber defamation against the ISP nationwide, even though
the ISP might not be a party to the underlying defamation action.
D. Potential Concerns with and Objections to Proposed Federal
Takedown Remedy
A federal takedown remedy such as the one proposed above might
encounter opposition from interested parties such as ISPs. While there
are several possible objections that may be presented, I will address each
in turn and demonstrate how this solution nullifies such concerns.
First, as defamation is a state tort action, there are different standards
for defamation in each state. Unless Congress enacts a federal defamation
law, the standards will always differ to some extent, yet the foundation
for each state defamation action is the same. As long as the victim is able
to prove the content defamatory, the differing standards by state should
not matter. Further, there could be concerns about added litigation costs
for enforcing the takedown remedy pursuant to the statute. This concern
could be easily remedied by placing the cost on the defendant of paying
the fees to enact the takedown remedy.
Additionally, as the § 230 broad immunity has been consistently
upheld since Zeran, the creation of a federal takedown remedy could be
viewed as opening the doors for enforcing other causes of action against
ISPs. However, the proposed addition to § 230 only permits the
enforcement of the federal takedown remedy against ISPs and explicitly
provides that ISPs are protected from all other civil liability.
The proposal and availability of a federal takedown remedy for
Internet defamation action is a subject of controversy in the legal field.
Most scholars in examining the remedies available in defamation cases
have focused on the no-injunction rule and issues relating to prior
restraint of speech in violation of the First Amendment.181 However,
"much of the current action in defamation cases," specifically cyber
defamation, revolves around the issue of post-publication injunctions.
182
Generally, courts have consistently invoked the no-injunction rule in
defamation cases.1 83 Plaintiffs have been required to overcome the law's
preference for legal over equitable remedies184 and the First Amendment
prior restraint doctrine.' 
85
The First Amendment prior restraint doctrine also presents a sturdy
181. See Ardia, supra note 3, at 83; Rendleman supra note 20, at 4 ("A large grey area blurs
the border between the background interests in reputation and expression.").
182. Ardia, supra note 3, at 83.
183. Id. at 20-21; see Rendleman supra note 20, at 5-6.
184. Ardia, supra note 3, at 32-34; Rendleman supra note 20, at 6 ("Maxim that 'Equity
will not enjoin defamation."').
185. Ardia, supra note 3, at 32-34; Rendleman supra note 20, at 6.
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barrier to seeking an injunction in defamation cases.'86 In the seminal
case of Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court first invoked the First
Amendment's free speech guarantees to invalidate an injunction.
187
Following Near, courts utilized a case-by-case application of the prior
restraint doctrine.'88 The Court first entertained the possibility of
allowing an injunction in certain speech cases in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission of Human Relations.189 The Supreme Court in
Pittsburgh Press remarked that the concern with "prior restraint is that
communication will be suppressed ... before an adequate determination
that it is unprotected by the First Amendment."'190 The Court left the door
open for determining whether an injunction following a finding of
defamation would be constitutional.'91
Accordingly, there is an emerging trend "within both state and federal
courts that permits injunctions if the speech in question was adjudged to
be defamatory."'192 After examining the issue of injunctions in defamation
cases, several scholars have concluded that injunctions may be permitted
as a remedy to enjoin defamatory speech in certain contexts, such as when
there has been an adjudication deeming the speech defamatory.'93 Thus,
as proposed in the solution above, in the post-publication, post-
adjudication context of Internet defamation, an injunction requiring the
takedown of the defamatory content should not be barred by the First
Amendment.94 The proposed federal takedown remedy would be
narrowly tailored and limited to post-publication speech found to be
defamatory after a judgment on the merits.
Further, an interesting and somewhat novel concern could be the
burden of a federal takedown remedy on ISPs. Here, requiring ISPs to
remove defamatory content authored by a third party would not be unduly
burdensome because ISPs are required to do this routinely in other
countries.'95 There is one final characteristic of the proposed federal
186. See Ardia, supra note 3, at 32-33; Rendleman supra note 20, at 23.
187. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931) (invalidating an injunction because it
"imposes an unconstitutional restraint upon publication" violating the First Amendment).
188. Ardia, supra note 3, at 33.
189. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n of Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
190. Id. at 390.
191. See id.; Ardia, supra note 3, at 41 (citing Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. at 738-39 ("the
Tory Court left the door open by stating that an injunction 'may still be warranted,' if it were
'tailored to these changed circumstances'.")).
192. See Ardia, supra note 3, at 51.
193. See Rendleman, supra note 20, at 90 ("strong recent scholarship by Professor Ardia
and Dean Chemerinsky supports a limited defamation injunction.").
194. See Ardia, supra note 3, at 58, 60, 62; Rendleman supra note 20, at 92 ("a judge should
consider an injunction to be an appropriate remedy for a defendant's proved defamation.").
195. See Defamation Act 2013, c.26 (U.K.); E.U. Electronic Commerce Directive, supra
note 12.
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takedown remedy that is necessary to quell concern. The federal
takedown remedy will only be enforceable in the United States, its
territories and possessions. The federal takedown remedy will not address
situations where the ISP is not domiciled in the United States and
enforcement is difficult. 196 This will always be a problem regardless of
changes to § 230 until there is a global Internet law with takedown
remedies enforceable against all ISPs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Eighteen years have passed since Congress enacted the CDA with the
goal of promoting the growth of the Internet.197 Today, the Internet is a
pervasive part of everyday life, and the CDA, specifically § 230, is no
longer equipped to adequately address the legal problems that arise due
to the unique aspects of the Internet. While U.S. scholars have remarked
on the need to amend § 230 to include a takedown remedy, no scholar has
considered the jurisdictional and practical problems of enforcing a federal
takedown remedy for a state tort defamation claim.
The U.K. Defamation Act 2013 provides insight into methods for
amending § 230 of the CDA to account for the problem of cyber
defamation on the Internet. This Article, after studying the 2013 U.K. Act
and both the jurisdictional and constitutional problems associated with
cyber defamation in the United States, provides guidance for how to
effectively amend § 230 of the CDA. The proposed solution in this
Article will restore the inequities facing victims of cyber defamation to a
proper balance. This solution sets forth a framework for amending § 230
to include a federal takedown remedy, which will be enforceable
throughout all U.S. jurisdictions. While this solution will not address the
problem of global cyber defamation, this solution will bring § 230 in line
with similarly situated countries. Cyber defamation victims will be in a
better position to seek and achieve the remedy they desire, takedown of
the defamatory content. Although § 230 broad ISP immunity needs to be
re-evaluated, a federal takedown remedy will remain crucial and
necessary to maintaining a balanced and fundamentally fair legal system
for cyber defamation victims in light of the unique aspects of the Internet.
196. Rendleman, supra note 20, at 56 ("The Internet is international. An injunction that
forbids defendant's Internet defamation may not be effective because the injunction may be
followed by copying and mirror sites, some overseas. Potential defendants may be beyond the
court's jurisdiction over persons and territory.").
197. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1998).
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Appendix A: Proposed Draft of Federal Takedown
Remedy Provision
230(c) Protection for "good samaritan" blocking and screening of
offensive material
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable for monetary relief, or except as provided in subsection (gfor
injunctive or other equitable relief,1 on account of-
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to
or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing,
or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access
to material described in paragraph (1).
(g) Proposed Federal Takedown Remedy: (new provision)
2
(1) Takedown Process: To qualify for the federal takedown remedy:
(A) The plaintiff shall file a suit for defamation in the appropriate
state court against the author or poster of the defamatory
statement. No later than the third day after service of process on
the author or poster, the plaintiff shall request the court to issue a
Notice of Action and Right to Intervene to the interactive
computer service.
(i) The plaintiff s complaint shall include the following:
(1) the identity and address of the interactive computer
service;
(2) a Notice of Action and Right to Intervene addressed
to the interactive computer service;
(3) reference the plaintiff's intent to file for the takedown
This added language comes from the language of the notice-and-takedown provision
of the DMCA. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
2 This provision bestows jurisdiction upon the federal district courts to grant and enforce
an injunction, a takedown decree, against an interactive computer service.
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remedy pursuant to this section of § 230 after the
conclusion of a trial in plaintiff's favor; and
(4) the plaintiff's request for a referral to the district court
if the plaintiff prevails.
(ii) The Notice of Action and Right to Intervene shall include
the following:
(1) a copy of the complaint;
(2) a statement hat plaintiff seeks to enforce a takedown
decree pursuant to this section of § 230 after the
conclusion of a trial in plaintiff's favor;
(3) a statement that the interactive computer service has
the right to intervene; and
(4) inform the interactive computer service of a deadline
to intervene which shall be no later than the 20th day
after the date that the interactive computer service is
served with the Notice of Action and Right to Intervene.
(iii) The Interactive Computer Service's Right to Intervene
If the interactive computer service elects to intervene,
then the interactive computer service shall file a notice
to intervene and a motion to remove the case to the
appropriate district court pursuant to this statute.
(B) If the interactive computer service does not intervene, then
the state court case proceeds without the interactive computer
service as a party. If the plaintiff prevails and a judgment is
entered in plaintiff's favor, then the plaintiff may qualify for the
takedown remedy.
(C) If the plaintiff prevails, the plaintiff may register the state
court judgment with the appropriate district court. The plaintiff
shall file a motion in the district court requesting the court to
recognize the state court judgment and issue a takedown decree
directing the interactive computer service to takedown the
defamatory statement(s) pursuant to this provision of § 230.
(2) Safe Harbor: Defense to and Protection from Federal Takedown
Remedy
(A) If the interactive computer service permits users to delete and
[Vol. 27
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edit content after the user has posted the content on the website,
then the interactive computer service is not subject to this
provision of § 230 and is afforded the protection under § 230(c).
(B) If the interactive computer service, upon receipt of Notice of
Action and Right to Intervene from (1)(a), elects not to intervene,
the interactive computer service may consent in writing to
takedown the defamatory content should a judgment be entered
in plaintiffs favor. If the interactive computer service files its
written consent in the state court and takes down the defamatory
content after it receives notice of a judgment in plaintiff s favor,
then the interactive computer service is not subject to this
provision of § 230 and is afforded the protection under § 230(c).
If the interactive computer service fails to takedown the
defamatory content, no later than the 20th day after notice of
judgment is received, then the interactive computer service is not
protected from the federal takedown remedy and the plaintiff may
register the judgment with the appropriate district court.
(C) This provision shall not subject an interactive computer
service to monetary relief. However, if the interactive computer
service fails to comply with a takedown decree pursuant to this
section, the interactive computer service shall be held in contempt
and subject to monetary sanctions.
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